




































On natural law as a possible normative 
reference point in legislative processes
Abstract: In the modern era, the only indicator of the validity of law is that it is 
passed by the authorities in accordance with procedures. Has the classical theory 
of natural law ceased to matter? The author, referring to contemporary state-
ments of popes and documents of the Catholic Church, analyses what significance 
natural law has today from a normative point of view and why it is particularly 
important in the present-day world, as well as in a multicultural world.
Keywords: law, natural law, rule of law
Abstrakt: W epoce nowożytnej jedynym wyznacznikiem słuszności prawa jest 
uchwalenie go przez władzę zgodnie z procedurami. Czy klasyczna teoria prawa 
naturalnego przestała mieć już znaczenie? Autor powołując się na współczesne 
wypowiedzi papieży i dokumenty Kościoła Katolickiego analizuje jakie znaczenie 
prawo naturalne ma dzisiaj z punktu widzenia normatywnego i dlaczego właśnie w 
czasach obecnych ma ono znaczenie szczególne także w świecie wielokulturowym.
Słowa kluczowe: prawo naturalne, praworządność, prawo
In searches conducted in contemporary political philosophy, if treated as an area 
of  searching for justifications for the current normative system, strictly individu-
alistic assumptions are usually adopted. Undoubtedly, apart from the highly 
engaging analyses of multicultural societies, in which not so many similarities 
between individual citizens of the same state should be taken into account, even 
those with different ethno-cultural roots (the problem brought by the so-called 
difference policy postulated today sometimes as an antidote to the famous and 
still mentioned “melting pot”, “Fusing all citizens in a one cultural fashion”1), the 
1  See more widely in Polish literature, for example, Szahaj 2004.
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vision of an “abstract entity” equipped with variously arranged innate rights is 
still usually restored or sustained and made a starting point for further searching. 
According to the view, the law order determined by the variously understood 
“law-making body” (this might be the so-called political nation as well, sometimes 
called the “sovereign”, speaking in the forms of the so-called direct democracy, and 
a representative body appearing in various forms, but legitimized by the so-called 
political nation), usually presented as a set of guarantees for such perceived rights/
powers (perceived as an entity, due to each and every unit whose rights/powers 
are to be protected by a particular legal order, the so-called national law2). This 
way of thinking about normative order and legal value as having a “guarantee 
function” for individuals’ rights/powers (usually associated with human rights) 
plays a key role, among others in the search for justification for so-called humani-
tarian intervention and criteria for assessing the implementation of the rule of 
law by individual countries; however, it requires establishing a set of rights or 
subjective rights vested in individuals so that the area protected by legal norms is 
clearly and legibly determined. This way of thinking can sometimes be found in 
certain interpretations of the post-Conciliar teaching of the Catholic Church and 
the understanding of, among others, the Polish Constitution of 1997, with art. 30 
guaranteeing that the dignity of every citizen associated with the series of their 
rights/powers is honored. This way of thinking, however – rooted mainly in the 
seventeenth-century contemplations of John Locke, a key thinker, among others, 
for understanding John Rawls’s approach at the end of the 20th century – is no 
longer uncritically honored. Sometimes it is not only overlooked (e.g. in interpreta-
tions of the rule of law given by Jürgen Habermas, who is considered the creator 
of one of the most important projects of so-called deliberative democracy), but 
even openly contested (e.g. in critics presented by the influential thinker Chantal 
Mouffe today, in turn, one of the most important supporters of so-called agonic 
democracy).
2  We leave as a margin the very interesting question of “juridical monism” and the question 
raised in connection with it, especially by proponents of legal normativism, modelled 
mainly on the analysis of Hans Kelsen, about the primacy of public international law 
over national laws. We note, however, that in this case it concerns the possible primacy of 
a “higher order” normative order (legal value) compared to the “lower order” normative 
order (also legal value); thus the relationship between two normative orders is of similar 
value, both rooted in the will the legislator or the will of the body exercising another “type 
of power”. Let us add that usually supporters of monism understood in this way are – 
like Kelsen, mainly between the two world wars – critics of the traditionally understood 
concept of sovereignty, understood as the legislative exclusivity of a given “political being” 
(i.e. the state).
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It is worth noting, however, one fact already raised by a writer in another text 
that there are still disputes over whether individual freedom and group freedom 
– categories difficult to grasp from a positivist perspective, which requires taking 
into account the “empirical concept of knowledge” – are to somehow take into 
account the understood law as a set of norms or do they not include them? There 
are still debates about the possible existence of some “higher normative order” 
or even a “higher law” no longer understood “in a juridical manner”, required 
even by normatively tuned supporters of juridical monism, but rather “in an 
ethical manner” as a set of moral guidelines, which, however, must be taken 
into account both in individual elections and when establishing the legal order; 
in the second case, members of differently conceived legislative bodies would 
take it into account and bind them with their will. These disputes and debates 
are extremely important, because they entangle their participants not only with 
the aforementioned reflection on the role of cultural contexts in which members 
of legislative bodies and citizens are stuck, differently thinking and making 
different decisions, but also with reflection on the possible existence something 
that exceeds the level of individuals and groups, and also transcends the level 
of rulings of legislative bodies; judgments no longer related only to the rights/
powers of individuals (in order to establish a guarantee of their integrity), but 
also (or instead of?) to the “higher normative order”. Catholic social teaching 
is usually associated with a defense of this approach: while Leo XIII at the end 
of the 19th and John Paul II at the end of the 20th century still recalled the 
existence of an “objective basis of law” of universal value within which they 
were to look for a foundation for “higher-order norms”, Benedict XVI at the 
beginning of the 21st century stated that the land was clearly eroded. Although 
for all of them the essence of freedom lies within the human being, it belongs to the 
nature of the human person and is its sign [John Paul II 1980], this freedom, also 
a member of the legislative body in a democratic state, is realized not because 
of the subjectively established criteria of what is appropriate, but because of the 
understanding of normative content by a free man. Each of them is exposed to 
the accusation resulting from relating the individual to Transcendence, finding 
for him some “higher purpose”, serving its implementation of some “higher 
normative order”, which is to lead to the depreciation of the freedom of a specific 
person, empirically a given individual not only in various cultures, also not 
knowing or considering a personal God, external to creation and each individual 
(albeit through the Word present in them), depreciation of the individual’s 
freedom by forcing him to accept the “collective self of the community of believ-
ers,” which the Church’s Magisterium is to reveal, in order to realise “real (real) 
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freedom”. John Paul II preached, after all, that man should be able to make a 
choice depending on the values  he considers his own; in this he will appear as a 
responsible being, because man is free because he has the ability to stand on the 
side of truth and good, he is free because he has the ability to choose. To be free is 
to be able and willing to choose; it is to live according to one’s conscience [John 
Paul II 1980], but a properly shaped conscience constituting a human center 
[Ratzinger 1988: 10], which is not always infallible and therefore – being a holy 
area in which God speaks to man – cannot constitute the highest instance that 
decides what is good and what is bad, but must adhere to the unchanging truth 
of moral law [John Paul II 1983]. Any attempt to build society and its rights 
based on the will of man supporting itself only on recognizing the content of 
his conscience, without taking into account the “unchanging content of moral 
law”, raises the threat of denial recognized by unprejudiced human reason, not 
referring to Revelation, the truth of being and the personal truth of a human 
being (associated with the “unchanging truth of the moral law”)3. The succes-
sor of John Paul II has already recognized not only that the service of law and 
combating the rule of injustice is and remains the primary task of a politician, 
but also that we are increasingly able to distinguish between good law and bad 
law, because the dominant culture, in which Western societies in particular 
still exist, has already abandoned the idea of  natural law typical for Catholic 
references to. This “specific idea” is based on the conviction that there is a bond 
between being and duty, which – in the name of dualism of being and duty, 
abrogation of naturalistic error – is denied by supporters of the positivist concept 
of nature and reason [Benedict XVI 2011]4.
John Paul II and Benedict XVI referred to the teaching of the 13th-century Christian 
Aristotelian, St. Thomas Aquinas; when they argued that the natural moral law 
recognized by man’s natural reason was to correspond to his personal structure, 
3  See more broadly [Szlachta 2017: 209-223]. Freedom is not about the freedom to do 
anything, it is freedom towards the Good in which happiness is only found. Good is the 
goal [Instruction on Christian freedom and liberation, 26].
4  A positivistic understanding of nature, says Benedict XVI, who perceives it in a purely 
functional way, as explained by the natural sciences, can not create any bridge between ethics 
and law, it can only cause functional responses again. The same applies, however, to reason 
in a positivist approach, which many consider to be the only scientific vision. According to 
it, what is unverifiable or may be falsified does not belong to the field of reason in the strict 
sense. Therefore, ethos and religion should be transferred to the sphere of subjectivity and 
removed from the sphere of reason in the strict sense of the word. Where only positivist reason 
reigns – and this is largely the case with our public awareness – classical sources of knowledge 
of ethos and law are excluded “ from the game” [Benedict XVI 2011].
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they usually referred to the natural inclinations5 of his nature; these tendencies are 
to constitute the content of human nature, specific to every individual belonging 
to a species, regardless of the culture in which it grows, sex, nationality or nation 
to which it belongs, regardless of the time of its occurrence in the temporal visible 
plan, and finally regardless of its social role; they are to constitute the human 
good and a point of reference for normative arrangements corresponding to the 
nature of the species, which are precisely what in the Catholic tradition has been 
referred to today as “natural law”, and through these arrangements to set the limits 
of legitimate human behavior6. This is extremely complex, or even complicated, 
and is important because, when considered in relation to human rights, it leads 
to a ruling on the need to introduce guarantees for respecting them, and the need 
to always take into account, in all circumstances, certain moral prohibitions by 
individuals and by lawmakers. The exercise of human rights must not lead to the 
denial of such prohibitions; also a decision of the legislative will, even if legitimized 
by the majority or all addressees, cannot lead to the negation of them,: No one 
and anyone should ever break the commandments, which oblige everyone to not 
offend in others, and above all in themselves, the dignity of a person common to 
all people [VS 52]7. The will of the legislators should be properly directed, capable 
of exceeding “purely particular” considerations, as it should not set norms that 
could be a temptation to oppose the personal or group interest of the political 
community [CCC 2236]. They should know “absolutely forbidden ways” and their 
will should take them into account, since they are binding in all circumstances 
5  The authors of the 2009 document, prepared by the International Theological Commission, 
to which we will refer many times in this text, use the term “dynamisms” of cities “tenden-
cies”, distinguishing three: to preserve and develop their existence, to reproduce in order 
to maintain the species, and given together to learn the truth about God as well as striving 
to live in a community, saying that starting from these inclinations one can formulate the 
first principles of natural law known by nature (discuss each of “dynamisms” or inclinations 
in points 48-51).
6  Human nature (species, and not different in every individual that would have “its own 
nature”) was the point of reflection presented by John Paul II especially in the encyclical 
Veritatis splendor (hereinafter VS)
7  The mandatory mandates were combined in his reflection by John Paul II with the principles 
of natural law, as evidenced in particular by the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which he 
reads, in which we read not only that natural law, which is the perfect work of the Creator 
[note this problematic statement], provides solid the foundations on which man can build the 
building of moral principles that guide his choices, establishes the necessary moral founda-
tion for building human community, which corresponds to the “subjective” or normative 
side of natural law (which is not the law that the dominant legal positivist thinks about 
because including the sanction of coercion), but we also read that natural law provides 
the necessary basis for civil law that is associated with it, either by reflection that draws 
conclusions from its principles, or by positive and legal additions [CCC 1959].
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(VS 75) and they must not be questioned even by reference to foreseeable – even 
politically elevated, because it alleviates social unrest – consequences of the actions 
of a legislative body. No one can demand or establish what is contrary to the dignity 
of persons and natural law, Catechism [CCC 2235]. If those in power make unfair 
laws or take actions contrary to the moral order, these regulations do not apply in 
conscience. Let us add: this is an important issue in the consideration of a possible 
opposition to conscience). Then power ceases to be power, and lawlessness begins 
[CCC 1903, with the calling of John XXIII]8.
8  If one does not recognize transcendent truth, the power of power triumphs and everyone strives 
to make the most of the means available to them, to impose their own benefit or their own 
views, regardless of the rights of others [Centesimus annus 44; hereinafter referred to as CA]. 
In these approaches, the subject’s freedom was already clearly associated with his choices 
made freely. The question was whether freedom, even if – as in liberal thinking usually 
associated with the speech of John Locke – in its extent determined by the collection of 
so-called inherent rights (natural rights thought subjectively), require the absence of natural 
law norms, or should be considered in connection with them, and in particular take into 
account “absolutely prohibited practices”; it is also about the freedom of legislative bodies, 
and about the morally correct behavior of individual individuals, those exercising their 
rights, called human rights. John Paul II pointed out in 1993 that 20th-century proponents 
of “certain doctrines” had already admitted to the individual conscience the prerogative of 
the highest instance of moral judgment, which categorically and infallibly decides what is 
good and what is bad, thus denying the idea of  the universal truth about the good, cognitively 
available to human reason, referring to the “human nature” wherein lies the foundation of 
good and which is to be a reference point for statements regarding the content of natural 
law, consistent with the content of human nature available to cognitive natural reason (VS 
32). Revelation teaches us that the power to decide about good and evil does not belong 
to man, but only to God. Man, of course, is free from the moment when he can understand 
and accept God’s commandments. He enjoys an extremely wide freedom, because he can eat 
“ from all the trees of this garden”. However, this is not unlimited freedom: it must stop before 
the “tree of knowledge of good and evil”, because it was called to accept the moral law that 
God gives man. In fact, it is through this adoption of moral law that human freedom truly 
and fully realizes itself. “Only one Good” knows perfectly well what is good for man, and 
therefore, for his love, good commands it in his commandments. God’s law, therefore, does 
not diminish, nor does it eliminate human freedom, on the contrary – it is its guarantee and 
promotes its development. However, some contemporary cultural tendencies are heading in a 
completely different direction, underlying quite numerous currents of ethical thought, which 
emphasize the alleged conflict between freedom and law. These include doctrines that give 
individuals or social groups the right to decide what is good and what is bad: in their view, 
human freedom can “create values” and enjoys precedence over the truth to such an extent 
that truth itself is considered one of the products of freedom. John Paul II also mentions the 
teaching of the Second Vatican Council emphasizes, on the one hand, the active participation 
of human reason in discovering and applying moral law: moral life requires creative thinking 
and intelligence appropriate to the person who is the source and cause of his own conscious 
actions. On the other hand, reason derives its truth and authority from eternal law, which is 
nothing but the wisdom of God Himself. The basis of moral life is therefore the principle of “ just 
autonomy” of man, the personal subject of his actions.. The moral law comes from God and 
always has its source in it: by the power of natural reason that comes from God’s wisdom, it 
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Similar arguments appear in the interesting, already mentioned document 
published in 2009 – during the pontificate of Benedict XVI – by the International 
Theological Commission entitled In search of universal ethics: a new look at 
natural law; the suggestion made by committee members reads clearly: natural 
law, whose content – though found differently – appears in various cultures, not 
only marked by a Christian approach. In their view, in an increasingly secular 
world, one should refer more and more directly to the concept of natural law, just 
as the popes of the 19th, 20th and 21st century did or do, as it is this law (taken, let 
us recall, not juridically, but as normative moral content) that is to make possible 
a dialogue between cultures and religions that would lead to universal peace and 
avoid the “war of civilization”, and also meet [...] the requirement of a rational 
justification for human rights … [PEU 35]. Referring to relativistic individualism, 
which considers each individual as a source of its own values, and society as only 
a pure agreement concluded between individuals on the basis of their choice of all 
applicable standards, the authors of the document indicate that the fundamental 
principles governing social and political life are not based only on conventions, 
but are natural and objective [PEU 35]. This decision, which exposes the moment 
of “fundamental principles”, which have a natural and objective character, seems 
to indicate a direction leading to the content of normative value, not associated (at 
least directly) with the abilities of individuals, but associated with norms that may 
be the source of subjective rights, or to set negative boundaries for such rights, and 
thus also negative boundaries for the legislator cognitively referring and approv-
ing by his will the content already known in natural law as a set of norms, and 
nature as the basis for ascertaining the content9. Moreover, it is also ruled that civil 
is also our own human right. [...] the natural law “is nothing but the light of reason infused 
by God. Thanks to it, we know what to do and what to avoid. God has given us this light, 
that is the law, in the act of creation.” The just autonomy of practical reason means that 
man possesses his own right, received from the Creator. However, the autonomy of reason 
cannot mean that reason itself creates moral values  and norms. If this autonomy led to the 
negation of the participation of practical reason in the wisdom of the Creator and the Divine 
Legislator, or if it were to indicate the freedom to create moral norms, depending only on 
historical circumstances or on the needs of human societies and cultures, such alleged 
autonomy would contradict the truth about man teaches the Church [VS 40].
9  A certain peculiarity in the analysed area is the authors’ recognition that the democratic form 
of governance is inseparably connected with permanent ethical values, which have their source 
in the requirements of natural law – again we should ask: perceived subjectively or objectively? 
-– see. PEU 35. and which, therefore, do not depend on the variability of the consensus 
reached by the arithmetic majority; also in the independence of “permanent ethical values” 
originating in the requirements of natural law and as such postulally untouchable to the 
“arithmetic majority” the question can be found: these values  should be associated with 
what is subjective or rather what is subject?) – see [PEU 35].
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rights [i.e. constituted by legislative organs, more broadly: by state organs] do not 
apply in conscience when they conflict with natural law. We already understand 
at this point that the “lower order norms” (civil rights based on the legislative will 
assigned to the constitutional or legislative body) are juxtaposed with the “higher 
order norms” (“natural law”). This conviction strengthens the next sentence: The 
church proclaims the right to object to the conscience, it is stated in the document 
and even the obligation to refuse to obey in the name of submission to a higher law 
(with reference to the encyclical of John Paul II Evangelium vitae, 73-74).
Members of the International Theological Commission recalled the words of 
the previously mentioned speech of Pope Benedict XVI at the headquarters of 
the United Nations in 2008: Experience teaches that the rule of law is often more 
important than justice, when the emphasis is on the law itself so that it appears 
as the sole result of legislative ordinances or normative decisions taken by various 
instances of the ruling authorities. When they are presented only in terms of the 
rule of law, rights can become provisions with a weak power of influence, detached 
from the ethical and rational dimension that constitutes their basis and purpose. 
We note that the “ethical and rational dimension” is a reference point, and even 
the basis, both for subjective rights and legal norms (or at least associated with 
their negative boundaries); it is also probably an important goal for both the moral 
subject and the legislator, because no one can forget (and this was to be expressed 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948), that respect for human 
rights is above all the result of unchanging justice, which also [rather than the will 
of the contracting parties] gives binding force to international proclamations. This 
aspect is often overlooked, says Benedict XVI, when he tries to deprive the law of 
their true function in the name of a narrow utilitarian vision [PEU, note 4].
The problem posed by Pope Benedict XVI to replace the “ethical and ratio-
nal dimension” in favor of a “narrow utilitarian vision” is associated with the 
dominance of legal positivism: recognizing that any claim to objective and universal 
truth would be a source of intolerance and violence and that only relativism can 
guarantee pluralism values  and democracy, its supporters are not only to reject 
attempts to refer to an objective and ontological criterion regarding what is just, 
but also to proclaim that the last instance of moral law and norms is the current 
law, judged by definition to be fair because it is an expression of the will legislators 
[PEU 7]. Let us note: applicable law, enacted law or – as we mentioned earlier – 
“civil” is not only the last instance of law, it is its foundation, but it is also the last 
instance of [...] moral norms, they are to be derived from it, which makes that such 
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norms, moral norms, are not different from the law and cannot constitute the 
criterion of correctness or rightness or justice of legal norms, but are established 
in them. This approach, found in the reflection of supporters and even apologists 
of legal rather than legal positivism (as in the Polish translation of the document 
cited), is problematic inasmuch as it abolishes the view defended by Pope Benedict 
and his predecessors: it is no longer possible to convince about the existence of 
some “higher law” to constitute – as we have seen – a justification for the existence 
of human rights and a normative context for possible opposition of conscience; 
it is no longer convincing that, having realized its content as a content allow-
ing to estimate the norms of the law, one can be considered as “non-binding in 
conscience”. Statutory law, after all, precedes all morality, for it is now the source 
of moral norms.
Contrary to this approach, the authors of the 2009 document find other defini-
tive foundations for both ethics and legal and political order than the will of 
the legislator establishing the law, regardless of who he is, or even the will of 
the “democratic legislator”, the “Representative of the sovereign”). These “final 
foundations” revealed in the renewed presentation of the doctrine of natural law 
are to be associated with the recognition that human persons and communities are 
competent or able, guided by the light of reason, to recognize the basic directions 
of moral action consistent with the very nature of the human subject and express 
them in a way normative in the form of rules or commandments. They are – as in 
St. Thomas and as in St. John Paul II – able to discern the basics of moral action 
invariably associated with nature (human species) and express them (they, not 
God) normatively. These basic rules, objective and universal, are called to create 
and inspire all moral, legal and political arrangements governing the lives of people 
and societies [PEU 9]10. In this connection, it seems understandable that the rules 
expressed in a normative way by individuals and human communities previously 
recognizing the basic directions of moral action consistent with the very nature of 
the human subject designate a permanent critical instance, which can be reached 
10  In point 51 of the document cited, we find an important ruling, also important due to 
appearing today in the basic laws of some countries (also in Article 30 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland of 1997). references to the “inherent dignity of the human person”; 
it says there that human-specific aspirations are met by the requirement, recognized by 
reason, of concrete realization of life in relationships with others, and in a society built on 
just foundations that are in accordance with natural law. This entails recognition of the 
equal dignity of all individuals of the human race, regardless of race or culture difference, 
and great respect for humanity wherever it is, including the smallest and most despised of 
its members [PEU 51].
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by each individual for the sake of understanding the content of justice, and so 
measures allowing to measure the correctness of statutory law11. Let us note again: 
these norms are neither elements of divine revealed law nor result from the activity 
of legislators of nations and states or international instances; constituting – as 
a natural law – a normative horizon in which the political order is to function, 
indicating a set of values  that seem to make society more human, relying on the 
requirements of common human persons [PEU 86], being normative expressions 
of objective rules (not subjective or intersubjective) and universal (not ruled in a 
given cultural or national context, therefore not particular, but just applicable to 
the entire human universe, to each of its representatives, in a word: to every human 
individual), these rules are defined by the natural order serving the person social 
[PEU 87], natural order, not supernatural, moreover recognised as “natural forces” 
and not derived from Revelation12.
11  The authors of the 2009 document add that moral principles adjudicated by the inherent 
reason of a man who recognizes in the species nature of man “aspirations” (“dynamisms”, 
“inclinations”), at least in their general formulation, can be considered universal because 
they use to all humanity. They also take on an unchanging nature in so far as they stem 
from human nature, whose essential elements remain identical throughout history [PEU 
52]. Although they are sometimes obscured or even erased from the human heart [which 
seems to be highly problematic, taking into account the thesis previously stated that they 
are written by God Himself] because of sin and cultural and historical conditions, they 
are to constitute a common basis on which can be based on a dialogue leading to universal 
ethics (ibid.) However, it is worth noting that the application of specific principles of natural 
law may – in the opinion of the authors of the document – take different forms in different 
cultures, and even within the same culture, but in different periods [PEU 53], which makes 
the subject, a particular human person should not get lost in what is specific and individual, 
which was accused of “situational ethics”, but must discover the “right rule” and establish 
an adequate norm of action derived from previous principles [PEU 57; an excellent role 
in this respect not only the science of individual conscience, presented for example in the 
encyclical Veritatis splendor, and discussed in Polish literature by Andrzej Szostek [Szostek 
1989], but also the study of virtues – both elements are mentioned in the PEU in paragraphs 
57-59, an important entry could appear: Therefore, natural law cannot be presented as a set 
of ready-made rules that a priori impose on a moral subject, but it is a source of objective 
inspiration for only personal decision-making.]
12  In this context, it seems less clear to indicate that the same rules are to protect the dignity 
of the human being in the face of changing ideologies, unless we adopt – already mentioned 
– a liberal interpretation (“critical instance” similar to Locke’s “law of nature” dictating 
the norm or norms protecting what is “private”) or – which is much more interesting – we 
will move towards establishing that the “renewed doctrine of natural law” hides a norma-
tive moment defining not only (not so much?) a juridical guarantee of compliance with 
postulatively inviolable subjective rights, but also ( how many?) measures of the actions of 
individual people and communities that discern the very nature of the human subject and 
based on it establish normative content (corresponding to objective and universal rules). 
See. more broadly [Szlachta 1992].
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If we follow the last lead, then it will be more understandable not only the thesis 
that the basic normative rules adjudicated by individuals and communities based 
on the previously known nature of the human subject constitute a permanent 
critical instance, as well as the thesis that the natural law consisting of them deter-
mines the basic ethical standard [PEU 9], a norm unknown to advocates of legal 
positivism, who recognized the law as a source of moral content as well13, a norm, 
however, which should not be associated with the physical laws of nature or with 
some heteronomic source, but with moral goods that are directly perceived by 
a human being who, rather than someone outside, formulates the principles of 
natural law [PEU 10 and 11]14. Therefore, it is the human subject, using his inherent 
reason (and not submitting to the will of an arbitrary legislator, even God thought 
of as in such a role of), has the principles of this law and is to respect them also 
when he sets the norms of “civil law“15.
13  It is also not surprising that Christianity does not have a monopoly on properly understood 
natural law. Indeed, a natural law based on reason, which is common to all people, is the 
basis for cooperation between all people of good will, regardless of their religious beliefs 
[PEU 9].
14  We note that the document of the International Theological Commission recalls the 
findings of St. Thomas Aquinas, who – contrary to medieval Muslim and Jewish philoso-
phers – clearly distinguished between a natural political order based on reason and a 
supernatural religious order based on the grace of revelation, ruling in particular that 
justice by which he governs the community for public good [it seems constituting a refer-
ence point for the will of the legislator, and at the same time the foundation of human 
rights, because it is associated with natural law], people can have sufficiently due to the 
natural law principles [PEU, note 31]. In connection with this resolution, it remains not 
only the difference in Christian approaches and the monotheistic ones mentioned above, 
which refer not to “inherent reason”, but to Revelation, but also the problem of voluntarism 
disrupting the project of Tomasz, discussed by the writer, including in [Szlachta 2012], and 
also mentioned by the authors of PEU as a position that led to the binding of the law only 
with the will itself, even if it was God’s will, and with the will separated from its internal 
focus on the good, to relativize all existing rational structures, weakening the possibility 
of their natural knowledge by man, and finally the thesis extremely critical to the whole 
Thomistic teaching of natural law, that nature is no longer a criterion for learning the full 
wisdom of God’s will (29-30, in connection with the comments of Scotsmen and Hobbes). 
See. also a lecture by Benedict XVI at the University of Regensburg in 2006 and – in 
conjunction with nominalism – [PEU 69-70].
15 He will note, by the way, referring to the broader text prepared by the writer of these words 
for the Days of John Paul II in 2017, that this is where the problem often raised by critics of 
the presented approach appears (already raised in this text), still present in Catholic science 
social, which exposes both the universalistic and rational dimension of natural law, which 
applies to every human being and to every knowable man: in the cited document it is said 
that the norms of righteous life and justice are expressed in the Word of God, which then 
transmits them to the human heart “like a wax, an image of the signet ring is squeezed, 
which passes through the wax, remaining on the ring” [PEU 26].
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Natural law, once again, as a set of moral norms recognizable by human inherent 
reason is, according to the position adopted by Catholics, a proper and necessary 
reference point for legislative activity; it is a kind of “higher law” not in the sense, 
however, that it would have a juridical value similar to that given by a man to 
normative provisions binding all their addressees, but in that it should be respected 
and taken into account in the decisions of entities wishing to preserve humanity, 
honor the proper nature of the species every human being. The universalistic 
dimension found in this approach to natural law is, however, also connected with 
reflection on norms and reflection on the powers of man as a human being; and 
with reflection on the moral conditioning (limits) of the legislator’s freedom, and 
with reflection on the moral conditioning (limits) of the freedom of each moral 
subject.
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